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REPLY TO BASINGER ON POWER ENTAILMENT 
William Hasker 
David Basinger has presented an interesting challenge to a central element in 
my argument against middle knowledge. I Before addressing this challenge, how-
ever, I wish to correct two misconceptions about my view which are reflected 
in Basinger's article. He represents me as holding that previous critics of middle 
knowledge have not been successful (MKHF, p. 331), when actually I find some 
of their arguments, paIticularly those presented by Robert Adams, to be forceful 
and extremely convincing. 2 What I do say is that previous discussions are "incon-
clusive" (RMK, p. 547), and the reason I say this is that these arguments rest 
on assumptions which proponents of middle knowledge are not obliged to accept; 
thus, there is room and need for additional arguments such as the one I present. 
But I do not think poorly of what others have done. 
The other misconception is this: Basinger represents me as holding, not that 
counterfactuals of freedom are false, but that they are incoherent (MKHF, p. 
332). But I do hold that all such counterfactuals are false. In any counterfactual 
situation in which a person would choose freely between various alternatives, 
what is true is that if confronted with such a situation she might choose anyone 
of the alternatives; it follows from this that any statement claiming that, if placed 
in such a situation, she would definitely choose some particular alternative is 
false. 3 
Basinger proceeds by raising questions about my "power entailment princi-
pies," principles which are important not only for the present discussion but for 
the controversy over divine foreknowledge and human freedom.4 The two prin-
ciples given in RMK are: 
(3) If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q" 
and "Q" is false, then it is in A's power to bring it about that Q. 
(4) If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q," 
then either it is in A's power to bring it about that Q, or the truth 
of "Q" is a necessary condition of A's having the power to bring 
it about that P. 5 
Basinger is correct in noting that these principles are crucial to my argument 
against middle knowledge. Indeed, given certain other assumptions (which 
Basinger also accepts), these principles suffice to show that counterfactuals of 
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freedom cannot be true." In his reply Basinger does not give any logical argument 
against my principles, nor does he cite any counter-examples to them. Rather, 
he presents a pair of principles of his own-principles which, he claims, are 
equivalent to mine in most contexts, but which diverge in such a way as to allow 
counterfactuals of freedom to be true. The proponent of middle knowledge, then, 
is at liberty to accept Basinger's principles instead of mine, and thus to claim 
that middle know ledge has not been refuted. Basinger's substitute principles are: 
(3') If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q" 
and "Q" is false, then it is in A's power to act in such a manner 
that, if she were to act in that fashion, "Q" would be (would 
always have been) true. 
(4') If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q," 
then either it is in A's power to act in such a way that if she were 
to act in that way, "Q" would be (would always have been) true 
or the truth of "Q" is a necessary condition of A's having the 
power to bring it about that P (MKHF, p. 334). 
I want to say at once that both (3') and (4') seem to me to be true. And 
Basinger is certainly correct in thinking that, unlike (3) and (4), his principles 
place no obstacle in the way of the theory of middle knowledge. But are they 
appropriate as replacements for (3) and (4)? In order to answer this, we need to 
see whether (3') and (4') are capable of performing, in their own way, the 
function which (3) and (4) were introduced to perform. That function may be 
described, in general terms, as that of identifying various states of affairs which 
are necessary conditions of persons' having the power to do various things. 
Basinger evidently thinks that there are such conditions, and that in many situ-
ations (3) and (4) are useful in identifying them. He has no difficulty with the 
idea that in order for me to have the power to see the sunrise, the sun must in 
fact be rising, and in order for me to be able to ring your doorbell it must be 
the case either that you already have a doorbell or I am able to provide you with 
one (MKHF, pp. 333). But he claims that with regard to the sunrise and doorbell 
examples, his principles and mine "come to the same thing" (MKHF, p. 335). 
Unfortunately, Basinger is wrong about this. As he observes, his principles 
differ from mine by replacing my phrase "then it is in A's power to bring it 
about that Q," with the longer phrase "then it is in A's power to act in such a 
manner that, if she were to act in that manner "Q" would be (would always have 
been) true" (MKHF, p. 334). But this change empties the principles of their 
force. In all four principles the antecedent of the conditional includes the phrase, 
"and "P" entails "Q. "" But if "P" entails "Q," then for A to have the power to 
bring it about that P just is for her to have the power to "act in such a manner 
that, if she were to act in that manner "Q" would be (would always have been) 
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true"! So the consequents in Basinger's principles fail entirely to specify any 
additional necessary conditions which must be satisfied if A is to have th e 
power to bring it about that P. The conditions specified in the consequents of 
(3') and (4') are automatically satisfied if the antecedents of the conditionals are 
true, and both "principles" reduce to the tautology 
(T) If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and etc .... then it 
is in A's power to bring it about that P. 
The truth of this need not be doubted. But it can scarcely do the job for which 
the power entailment principles were designed. 
Basinger seems to see this, at least in part, yet he fails to grasp its implications. 
With respect to his 'counterfactual' doorbell example (the one in which the 
proposition represented by 'Q' is itself a counterfactual) he states: 
In short, given (3'), the stipulated condition in question becomes 
tautological-i .e., A has it in her power to bring it about that P only 
if she has it in her power to bring it about that P-while given (3), this 
is not the case (MKHF, p. 335). 
Apparently, however, Basinger has failed to recognize that his principles collapse 
into tautology not only in this case, but in all others as well. He has given us 
no alternatives to the power entailment principles. 
Huntington College 
NOTES 
I. David Basinger, "Middle Knowledge and Human Freedom: Some Clarifications," Faith and 
Philosophy, 4 (1987), pp.330-336 (hereafter cited a, MKHF). Basinger is criticizing my article. "A 
Refutation of Middle KnOWledge." Nous, 20 (1986), pp. 545-557 (hereafter cited as RMK). 
2. See Robert M. Adams, "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil," American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 14 (1977), pp. 109-117. 
3. It should be noted that, in counterfactual logic, the proposition, "If it were the case that P, it 
might be the case that not-Q," is the contradictory of the proposition. "If it were the case that P. it 
would be the case that Q." See David Lewis, Counterjactuals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1973). 
4. For this application see my article, "Foreknowledge and Necessity," Faith and Philosophy, 2 
(1985), pp. 142-44. 
5. RMK, pp. 553, 554 (numbering of these principles taken from MKHF, p. 331). At this point I 
need to correct an oversight of my own with regard to principle (4). This principle is adapted from 
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Thomas B. Talbott, "On Divine Foreknowledge and Bringing About the Past," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 46, 1986, p. 460. In this connection Talbott states, "[IJt must. . be 
stressed that the kind of necessary condition specified in [4] is not a logically necessary condi-
tion ... [Flof those of us who are not omnipotent, not all the necessary conditions of OUf having 
the power to do something are logically necessary conditions" (Talbott, p. 461). Though aware of 
this qualification, 1 failed to mention it either in RMK or in "Foreknowledge and Necessity", and 
thus may have given some readers the impression that (only) logically necessary conditions were in 
view here. (I am indebted to Larry Hohm for pointing out this oversight.) 
6. It should be noted, however, that a proponent of middle knowledge might proceed by challenging 
the first part of my argument, which claims that the agent named in a counterfactual of freedom 
cannot bring about the truth of the counterfactual. If this could be refuted, then both the power 
entailment principles and middle knowledge could be accepted. 
